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Abstract
The paper analyzes an implementation of an optimal disability insurance system as a compet-
itive equilibrium with taxes. The problem is modeled as a dynamic mechanism design problem
in which disability is unobservable. We show that an asset-tested disability system in which a
disability transfer is paid only if an agent has assets below a speciﬁed maximum implements
the optimum. The logic behind the result is as follows: we show that an agent who falsely
claims disability has higher savings than a truly disabled agent, and an asset test prevents false
claimants from receiving disability. We also evaluate welfare beneﬁts of asset testing. For a
calibrated economy, we numerically compare the optimal system to the best system without
asset testing. We ﬁnd that gains of asset testing are signiﬁcant and equal to about 0.65% of
consumption.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program is one of the largest social insurance
programs in the United States. In 2001, the program provided income to more than 6 million
individuals, who accounted for 14 percent of Social Security beneﬁciaries. The program cost $61
billion and constituted 15 percent of Social Security beneﬁts. The size of the program far surpasses
spending on unemployment insurance, food stamps, or any other similar program (SSA 2000).
∗Golosov, MIT; Tsyvinski, UCLA, Harvard, and NBER. We thank audiences at Minneapolis Federal Reserve
Bank, Chicago GSB, Berkeley, Princeton, Harvard, MIT, Northwestern, University of Pennsylvania, Carnegie-Mellon,
Wharton Business School, Columbia Business School, McGill, Rochester, UCLA, SITE 2003, NBER Summer Insitute
2003, and SED 2001. We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu, Andy Atkeson, George-Marios Angeletos, Marco Bassetto,
Moshe Buchinsky, Hal Cole, Casey Mulligan, Hugo Hopenhayn, Larry Jones, Patrick Kehoe, Robert Lucas, Jr., Lee
Ohanian, Chris Phelan, Nancy Stokey, Ivan Werning and especially V.V. Chari and Narayana Kocherlakota for their
comments.
1Except for SSDI, few other options provide protection against disability risk. For example, only 25
percent of private-sector employees receive long-term disability coverage (SSA 2001).
In this paper we ﬁrst show how a dynamic optimal social insurance mechanism can be imple-
mented with a simple, realistic set of tax instruments — an asset-tested disability system. Second,
we carefully parametrize the model, compute the optimal system, and show that asset testing is
quantitatively superior to programs in which asset testing is not allowed.
As in the classic work of Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986), we assume that it is impossible
to know whether an individual is truly disabled, and that disability is a permanent state. Given
these assumptions, we solve a dynamic mechanism design problem and provide theoretical and
numerical characterizations of the social optimum. A key feature of the optimal allocation is that
intertemporal decisions of agents must be distorted.
The ﬁrst goal of the paper is to ﬁnd a simple tax system that will implement the optimal
allocation. By implementation we mean ﬁnding a tax system such that a solution to a competitive
equilibrium problem with taxes coincides with the optimal solution. We ﬁrst show that a simple
system conjectured by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), consisting of a linear tax that is equal to the
intertemporal wedge in the optimal allocation, does not implement the optimum. Then we propose
a very simple tax system implementing the optimum: an asset-tested disability program. An asset
test is a form of a means test in which a person receives a disability transfer only if his assets are
below a speciﬁed threshold. The logic behind the result is as follows: we show that an agent who
falsely claims disability has higher savings than a truly disabled agent, and an asset test prevents
false claimants from receiving disability.
To evaluate advantages of asset testing, we provide estimates of welfare gain obtained by shifting
from the best program without asset testing to the optimal program. In a calibrated model economy,
we found a signiﬁcant welfare gain of using asset tests that is equal to 0.65 percent of consumption.
The welfare gain is large because asset testing allows for signiﬁcantly higher disability transfers
compared to the program without asset testing.
Recent empirical evidence supports our argument that persons who falsely claim disability
have higher savings than disabled persons. A comprehensive study of disability applicants and
recipients by Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2004) ﬁnds (see Table 4 in their paper) that
non-disabled awardees of disability insurance have signiﬁcantly higher assets (87,017 dollars) than
disabled recipients (73,911 dollars). If the value of houses and cars is excluded from the calculations
of the net worth, then the diﬀerence between the assets of the truly disabled and "impostors" is
2even larger1.
Asset-tested programs, such as Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF),
a n dm a n yo t h e r s ,a r eu s e dw i d e l yi nU . S .s o c i a lp r ograms. It is recognized that asset testing has
important implications for life cycle savings (see Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995). Feldstein
(1985) argued for incorporating asset testing as a part of Social Security beneﬁts in a model with
myopic agents. Our paper is the ﬁrst paper, to our knowledge, that derives optimality of asset
testing in a mechanism design environment. Since asset testing is a particular class of a means test,
this paper also extends the results on the optimality of means-tested programs (Besley and Coate
1995) and optimal income programs (Saez 2002) to the dynamic setting.
This paper also contributes to the study of optimal dynamic social insurance programs (Wang
and Williamson (1996) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)). The focus in these papers was on
ﬁnding optimal allocations rather than on tax systems implementing them. The diﬃc u l t yi nc o n -
structing realistic transfer systems that we highlight in this paper is present in other dynamic
mechanism design models, such as models of optimal unemployment insurance. The techniques of
implementation in the presence of private savings that we develop in this paper can be used in
those settings.
Now we brieﬂy discuss the main technical points of the paper. The optimal allocation features
an intertemporal wedge as in Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) who showed that in-
tertemporal distortion of savings is a feature of the optimum for a general class of dynamic taxation
problems. The simplicity of the environment here allows us to ﬁnd a realistic set of taxes imple-
menting the optimum. Albanesi and Sleet (2003) and Kocherlakota (2003) study a more general
version of the dynamic taxation problem and propose implementation with wealth and labor taxes.
We show that an asset-tested disability system is simple yet suﬃcient to implement the optimum.
We ﬁrst show that a simple system conjectured by Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), consisting of a
linear tax that is equal to the intertemporal wedge in the optimal allocation, does not implement
the optimum. Intuitively, this tax can control only single but not joint deviations. Given that
an agent has correct savings, he chooses to work when able. Given that he works when able, he
chooses correct savings. We show that an agent, faced with such a linear savings tax, chooses to
jointly deviate: choose not to work when able and choose a diﬀerent amount of savings than that
required to implement the optimum. This subtle reasoning illustrates diﬃculties in implementing
1We are grateful to Moshe Buchinsky for extensive discussions of assets of disabled and non-disabled recepients
and pointing us to this data.
3optimal dynamic taxation or social insurance programs and the intuition behind implementation
using asset tests.
We parameterize the model by solving a stylized version of the current social insurance system
in the United States and numerically evaluate features of the optimal allocations and welfare gains
of asset testing. The best program without asset testing is equivalent to the solution of the optimal
program with hidden savings. The welfare gain of asset testing is thus the diﬀerence between
the optimal program with and without hidden savings. We compare the welfare from the optimal
system to that obtained under the optimal system with hidden savings. Computation of a disability
model with hidden savings is diﬃcult as the dynamic ﬁrst-order approach pioneered by Werning
(2001) and Abraham and Pavoni (2003) is not applicable in our framework. The simplicity of
the model that we chose, however, allowed us to compute optimal allocation with hidden savings
without relying on the ﬁrst-order approach.
The key to our analysis is that we assume disability is unobservable and permanent. In practice,
determining disability status proves to be very diﬃcult. Multiple medical and vocational factors
are taken into account when determining whether an individual is eligible for disability beneﬁts.
However, even the determination of medical factors is often subjective. In 2001, a share of awards
to applicants with diﬃcult-to-verify criteria, such as mental disorders (mainly mental stress and
excluding retardation) and diseases of the musculoskeletal system (typically back pain), constituted
around 50 percent of total awards. Disability is a fairly permanent state. For example, only less
than 5 percent of those who start receiving disability beneﬁts return to work2. For a detailed
discussion of diﬃculties in determining disability and the data on the number of people leaving
disability, see Bound and Burkhauser (1998).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we describe the setup of the
model. In Section 3, we provide a theoretical characterization of the optimum. In Section 4, we
discuss implementation of the optimum. In Section 5, we provide numerical results. Finally, we
conclude in Section 6.
2A low number of disabled returning to work does not necessarily mean that disability is a permanent state. It
could indicate, for example, generosity of beneﬁts. However, a very low number of those returning to work gives us
conﬁdence that modelling disability as a permanent state is fairly realistic.
42S e t u p
In this section we describe the basics of the model. An agent lives for T periods and has preferences





where E denotes expectation operator, 0 <β<1,a n dct and lt denote the period t consumption
and labor of an agent. We assume that u0 > 0, u00 < 0,a n dv0 < 0.
An agent can become disabled in period t, and his skill θt is then equal to zero. We assume
that disability is an absorbing state and that once disabled, an agent stays disabled for the rest of
his life. Skills of able agents evolve deterministically over time.
Because disability is an absorbing state, we need to keep track only of the agent’s age and the
age at which he became disabled. In period t,ah i s t o r yht b e l o n g st oas e t{1,2,...,t,A}.W ew i l l
say that ht = A if an agent is able or ht = j if an agent became disabled at age j.W e d e n o t e
the probability, as of period 1, of a particular history ht by µ(ht). The probability of history ht+1
conditional of the realization of history ht is denoted µ(ht+1|ht). We denote consumption of an able
agent of age t as ct(A), and his eﬀective labor as yt(A).C o n s u m p t i o ni np e r i o d st+i (0 ≤ i ≤ T −t)
of an agent who became disabled at age t is denoted by ct+i(t).
The agent’s disability status is unobservable3. When an agent with skill θt works lt units of
time, he produces yt = θtlt units of eﬀective labor. Eﬀective labor yt is observable, while the skill
θt and labor lt are the agent’s private information. The informational problem is also dynamic
because an agent learns whether he is disabled at the beginning of period t and not before.
We assume that the disutility of labor if an agent is disabled is equal to inﬁnity, and the agent
chooses to supply zero units of labor. If an agent provides a positive amount of eﬀective labor, the
planner knows that he is able. However, if an agent does not work, the planner does not know
whether the agent is truly disabled, or able but pretending to be disabled. If a person is disabled
and has a skill θ =0we normalize v(·)=0 .W e a l s o n o r m a l i z e v(0) = 0, i.e., if an able agent
chooses not to work, then his utility from labor is equal to zero.
We consider a setting in which the net interest rate R and the wage w are constant over time
3In the working paper version of the paper (Golosov and Tsyvinski 2003) we also consider a case of imperfectly
observable disability.
5and assume that β =
1
1+R
. Since consumption is observable we can restrict our attention to an
aggregate intertemporal feasibility constraint rather than consider agent-speciﬁcc o n s t r a i n t s . A n












(1 + R)t−1µ(ht)wyt(ht). (1)
Allocations must respect incentive-compatibility conditions because the age at which an agent
becomes disabled is private information. Since the skill of disabled agents is equal to zero, only
able agents can misreport their skills. In particular, for an agent who lives T periods, the number
of ex post incentive constraints is T because disability is an absorbing state, and once an agent
announces that he is disabled, he cannot claim to be able to work in the future.
We deﬁne incentive compatibility constraints recursively. We denote by V d(t) the utility of an





Now we recursively deﬁne the expected utility of an agent who is able at time t.A tt i m eT the
utility of an able agent is equal to




At time t<Tthe expected utility is deﬁned by:




µ(ht+1 = A|ht = A)V a(t +1 )+µ(ht+1 = t +1 |ht = A)V d(t +1 ) .
Incentive compatibility constraint then becomes
V a(t) ≥ V d(t),f o r1 ≤ t ≤ T. (2)
The incentive-compatibility constraints state that in each period the expected utility of working is
higher than the utility of claiming disability.




µ(h1 = A)V a(1) + µ(h1 =1 ) V d(1)
subject to (1) and (2).
In each period, a social planner chooses allocations of consumption and eﬀective labor which
depend on the agent’s history, that is, on when an agent became disabled. A social planner chooses
these allocations to maximize the lifetime expected utility of a representative agent. The constraint
set of the problem is deﬁned by feasibility and incentive-compatibility constraints.
3 Characterizing Pareto Optima
In this section we provide a theoretical characterization of the optimal allocation.
3.1 Full information benchmark
First, we start with a useful benchmark. If disability status is perfectly observable, then a social
planner can achieve full insurance. For ∀ht, c∗(ht)=¯ c, i.e., consumption is constant over time, and











3.2 Features of the optimal contract
In this section, we characterize the optimal solution when disability is unobservable. We call an
allocation (c,y) to be interior if yt(A) > 0 for all t. In the rest of the paper, we assume that the
optimum is interior.
Proposition 1 In the optimal allocation, the following properties are satisﬁed:
1. The feasibility constraint holds with equality;
2. Incentive constraints hold with equality in each period;
3. In each period, ct(A) >c t(t).
Proof. In the appendix.
7Now we show that the consumption-labor margin is undistorted for able agents. This result is
reminiscent of a result that in a static environment labor decisions of the highest skilled agent are
undistorted (Mirrlees 1976).
Proposition 2 (Consumption-labor of able is not distorted) Suppose (c∗,y∗) solves (P).T h e n











Proof. See the appendix.
The intertemporal margin, however, is distorted. An optimal solution has a wedge between
a marginal rate of substitution and a marginal rate of transformation for able agents who face a
non-zero probability of becoming disabled. We can now show a result that is similar to that of
Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) to provide a characterization of the intertemporal
wedge at the optimal solution.

















t+1(t +1 ) )




Proof. In the appendix.
If future skills are not perfectly predictable given the current history of skills, then due to
Jensen’s inequality the above ﬁrst-order conditions are not equivalent, and we can prove the fol-
lowing lemma.
Corollary 1 (Intertemporal decisions of able are distorted) Suppose (c∗,y∗) solves P.T h e n
if the probability of becoming disabled is interior 0 <µ (ht+1 = t +1 |ht) < 1,
u0(c∗
t(A)) <β (1 + R){µ(ht+1 = A|ht = A)u0(c∗
t+1(A)) (3)
+µ(ht+1 = t +1 |ht = A)u0(c∗
t+1(t +1 ) ) }.
Proof. Apply Jensen’s inequality to the condition in Proposition 2.
After an agent becomes disabled, all uncertainty is resolved, and there is no need to distort his
intertemporal decision. Since we assumed that β =
1
1+R
, the consumption of disabled is constant.
8Corollary 2 (Consumption of disabled is constant) Suppose (c∗,y∗) solves (P). Then
c∗
t(t)=c∗
t+i(t),f o r1 ≤ i ≤ T − t.
Proof. In the appendix.
4 Implementation of the Optimum
In this section we propose a simple tax system that implements the optimal allocation and includes
only taxes and transfers similar to those already in the U.S. tax code.
Since the only restrictions on the social planner’s problem are incentive compatibility and feasi-
bility, we implicitly allow a very large set of taxes. In fact, we allow any nonlinear taxes, including
lump-sum taxes. Because of the generality of taxes, the social planner’s allocation can be imple-
mented in multiple ways, the most obvious of which is a direct mechanism. However, the direct
mechanism and many other mechanisms are complex and may include taxes that have never been
used in practice.
A theoretical challenge is to design a simple, realistic tax system that includes only elements
that are already present in existing social programs. We ﬁrst illustrate a diﬃculty in constructing
simple tax systems with an example of a linear savings tax. This type of implementation is common
in Ramsey literature of optimal taxation (see a review in Chari and Kehoe 1999). We show that
such a tax does not implement the optimum, since it cannot prevent agents from overaccumulating
assets and falsely claiming disability.
Despite these diﬃculties, we propose a strikingly simple tax/transfer system that implements
the optimum: an asset-tested disability system. The proposed tax system consists of two important
features. The ﬁrst feature is that disability transfers have to depend on the length of pre-disability
work history. The second feature is designed to control negative incentive eﬀects of savings. Disabil-
ity transfers should be asset-tested, that is, paid only to agents who have assets below a pre-speciﬁed
minimum. Even though these features are not currently in SSDI, all of the proposed taxes and
transfers are already present in the U.S. tax code and in other social programs. Some welfare
programs, such as Supplemental Security Income and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,
are asset-tested.
This section is organized as follows: We start with formally deﬁning a competitive equilibrium
with taxes. We then present a simple two-period example that shows that a linear savings tax does
9not implement the optimum. We proceed to design an asset-tested tax system that implements
the optimum in a two-period example. Finally, we formally prove that an asset-tested disability
system is the optimal allocation for a T-period economy.
4.1 Competitive equilibrium
We want to design a system of taxes and disability transfers so that competitive equilibrium allo-
cations in such economy are constrained eﬃcient. First, we formally deﬁne competitive equilibrium
with taxes.
Deﬁnition 1 Given a tax system {τt(y(ht),k(ht))}, allocations of consumption, labor supply, and















c(ht)+k(ht) ≤ wy(ht)+( 1+R)k(ht−1)+τt(y(ht),k(ht));













W ew i l ls a yt h a tat a xs y s t e m{τt(y(ht),k(ht))} implements the optimal allocation (c∗,y∗) if
(c∗,y∗) is equal to competitive equilibrium allocations (˜ c, ˜ y) deﬁned above.
4.2 Simple example of implementation
In this section, we illustrate implementation of the solution to the social planner’s problem with a
s i m p l ee x a m p l et h a tw i l la l s oc l a r i f yt h er o l eo fa s s e tt e s t i n g .W ec o n s i d e ras e t u pi nw h i c ha g e n t s
live for two periods and are able in the ﬁrst period of their lives. When an agent is able, he has a
skill θ =1 . In the second period of his life, an agent will be able with probability µa and disabled
with probability (1−µa). Denote consumption of an able agent in period 1 by c1, of an able agent
in period 2 by ca, and of a disabled agent in period 2 by cd. Denote allocations of eﬀective labor of
able agents in periods 1 and 2 by y1 and ya, respectively.





a)} is the one that maximizes the
expected lifetime utility of an agent subject to feasibility and incentive compatibility.
max
(c,y)












It is fairly straightforward to solve this social planner’s problem. We take ﬁrst-order condi-
tions and rearrange them to obtain two features of the optimal allocation: intertemporal savings
distortion and no distortion in labor decisions.













The IEE implies that there is an intertemporal wedge, an analog to Corollary 1
u0(c∗
1) ≤ (1 + R)β[µau0(c∗
a)+( 1− µa)u0(c∗
d)]. (5)
We can also derive an analog to Proposition 2 that labor decisions of able agents are not







Competitive equilibrium with uniform linear taxes is not Pareto optimal Implementa-
tion may seem to be simple in this example. One can conjecture (as in Diamond and Mirrlees 1978)
that a linear savings tax that is equal to the intertemporal wedge in equation (5) and correctly
chosen lump-sum taxes implement the optimal allocation. We will show that this conjecture is
false, as there exists a proﬁtable deviation for an agent.
Consider a tax system that consists of a savings tax τ,at a xTa in period 1, and taxes Ta if an







−τRk2 + Ta,i fy2 > 0





We deﬁne taxes τ, Ta, Td as follows. Savings tax τ is equal to the intertemporal wedge in the











We deﬁne Ta and Td from the budget constraints of an agent who works in period 2 if he is
able. We solve the system of linear equations to ﬁnd taxes Ta,a n dTd and a level of capital k∗
2 such




1 + Ta (9)
c∗
a =( 1+R(1 − τ))k∗
2 + wy∗
a + Ta (10)
c∗
d =( 1+R(1 − τ))k∗
2 + Td. (11)
We now show that this system of taxes does not implement the optimal allocation.
Proposition 4 (Competitive equilibrium with linear tax not eﬃcient) The tax system






Proof. We will show that the agent who faces the tax system deﬁned in (6)-(11) always obtains a
higher utility if he chooses y2 =0in the second period and receives disability beneﬁts Td in both
states. This implies that (c∗,y∗) cannot be implemented.






c1 + k2 = wy1 + Ta
12c2 =( 1+R(1 − τ))k2 + Td.




T os e et h i sn o t i c et h a t(c∗
1,c ∗
d,y∗
1) belongs to the budget constraint of the agent, so it is feasible.
The solution to Problem 1, (˜ c1,˜ c2, ˜ y1), satisﬁes the following necessary condition
u0(˜ c1)=( 1+( 1− τ)R)βu0(˜ c2). (12)
(c∗
1,c ∗




1)=( 1 + ( 1 − τ)R)β[µau0(c∗
a)+( 1− µa)u0(c∗
d)]





1) is not a solution to Problem 1. We showed that an agent can obtain a higher
utility from the above strategy then the utility of the disabled. Since the incentive constraint binds,










2)) + (1 − µa)u(c∗
d)].
This argument shows that the optimum (c∗,y∗) cannot be implemented.
Intuitively, a linear savings tax is not suﬃcient to implement the optimal allocation because it
is designed to preclude single deviations. Given that an agent tells the truth, a linear savings tax
guarantees that he chooses the correct amount of savings. Given that an agent chooses a correct
amount of savings, an agent chooses to tell the truth. Above we have shown that a joint deviation
may be proﬁtable in which an agent decides to jointly lie and change the amount of savings.
We illustrate this intuition graphically. In Figure 1, we plot indiﬀerence curves for consumption
in the ﬁrst period c1 and consumption in the second period c2. By incentive compatibility constraint,
utility of claiming disability in the social planner’s problem u(c∗
1)+u(c∗
d) is equal to the utility of
telling the truth. Point A represents this choice of (c∗
1,c ∗
d). Note that the slope of the indiﬀerence
c u r v ea tt h i sp o i n ti s−u0(c∗
1)/u0(c∗
d), and the tangency is represented by a dashed line. In a
competitive equilibrium with a linear tax τ, an agent’s budget line has a slope of −(1 + R(1 − τ))
13which is higher than −u0(c∗
1)/u0(c∗
d) by the deﬁnition of the tax. The agent then will choose point B
i nw h i c hh ec o n s u m e sl e s si nt h eﬁrst period (oversaves) and consumes more when disabled. Point
B is on a higher indiﬀerence curve and gives a higher utility than u(c∗
1)+u(c∗
d),h e n c e ,i tg i v e s
higher utility than telling the truth.
4.2.1 Asset-tested disability system implements the optimal solution
We claim that a simple tax system exists, consisting of an asset-tested disability system that can
implement the optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium. The proof used in this section
provides intuition for the proof of the general case in Section 4.3.
Let’s ﬁrst formally deﬁne an asset-tested disability system.
Deﬁnition 2 An asset-tested disability tax system is a collection of taxes τ1(y1) and τ2(y2,k 2),
and an asset limit k∗






Td, if y2 =0and k2 ≤ k∗
2




Budget constraints in the competitive equilibrium problem then become:
c1 + k2 = wy1 + T1 (13)




Td, if y2 =0and k2 ≤ k∗
2





cd =( 1+R)k2 + Td. (15)
We then can construct taxes and savings (T1,T a,T d,k∗









a + Ta (17)
14c∗
d =( 1+R)k∗
2 + Td. (18)
Using the equations above, we can re-write the feasibility constraint as follows:
T1 +
µaTa +( 1− µa)Td
1+R
=0 . (19)
We can now show that an asset-tested disability system implements the optimal allocation as a
competitive equilibrium.4
Proposition 5 Consider an optimal allocation (c∗,y∗) and any (T1,T a,T d,k 2) that satisfy (16) −
(18).T h e n (c∗,y∗) can be implemented in a competitive equilibrium by an asset-tested disability
system that pays T1 in the ﬁrst period, Td if an agent does not work (y2 =0 ) and has assets that
are lower than the asset limit (k ≤ k2) in the second period, and Ta otherwise in the second period.
Proof. We show that there exists no allocation (˜ c, ˜ y,˜ k) that satisﬁes budget constraint (13)−(15)
and delivers higher utility to an agent than the utility from (c∗,y∗,k∗).
It is easy to see that Ta <T d, or, equivalently, c∗
a − wy∗
a ≤ c∗
d. If this were not true then the
planner would give an able agent the allocation for disabled (c∗
d,0) that gives the same ex ante
utility by the incentive compatibility but utilizes less resources.
First, we show that there exists no allocation (˜ c, ˜ y,˜ k) that satisﬁes budget constraint (13)−(15)
with ˜ k>k ∗
2 and delivers higher utility to an agent than the utility from (c∗,y∗,k∗). Under such
allocation (˜ c, ˜ y,˜ k), an agent pays Ta in the second period when both able and disabled. Consider
the maximum utility an agent can obtain in a competitive equilibrium if he receives Ta in the
second period regardless of labor eﬀort and call this allocation
³




ˆ c, ˆ y,ˆ k
´
is






The planner could have chosen this allocation
³
ˆ c, ˆ y,ˆ k
´
but did not do that, and, therefore, the
utility of this allocation cannot be higher than the utility from the allocations (c∗,y∗,k∗) that solve
the social planner’s problem. The utility of the allocation (˜ c, ˜ y,˜ k) is weakly smaller than the utility
4Originally, our implemenation had asset-tested disability and a savings tax. We are grateful to Ivan Werning for
suggesting an elegant version of the proof that did not have a savings tax.
15of the allocation
³
ˆ c, ˆ y,ˆ k
´
and, therefore, smaller than the utility of (c∗,y∗,k∗). An agent does not
choose any allocations with ˜ k>k ∗
2.
Alternatively, consider any allocation (˜ c, ˜ y,˜ k) that satisﬁes budget constraint (13) − (15) with
˜ k ≤ k∗
2. We separately consider allocations with y2 > 0 and with y2 =0for an agent who is able
in period 2:
(i) It is not optimal for an agent who works when able (y2 > 0)t oc h o o s ek<k ∗
2.
Such an agent pays taxes Ta when able and Td when disabled. Agent chooses allocations to
maximize his utility subject to (13)−(15) and k ≤ k∗
2. It is easy to see that for the utility maximizing
allocation the consumption-labor margin is undistorted, and the savings constraint binds (k = k∗
2).
Therefore, the agent chooses (c∗,y∗,k∗).
(ii) It is not optimal for an agent who does not work when able (y2 =0 )t oc h o o s ek<k ∗
2.
Such an agent pays Td when both able and disabled. The utility maximizing allocation for an





c1 + k2 = wy1 + Ta
c2 =( 1+R)k2 + Td
k ≤ k∗
2.
Similarly to (i), wu0(c1)=−v0(y1) and k = k∗
2. Therefore, the utility maximizing allocation is
equal to that of the agent who deviates and falsely claims to be disabled in planner’s problem. By
incentive compatibility, utility from such allocation does not exceed the utility from (c∗,y∗,k∗).
Therefore, (c∗,y∗,k∗) are the equilibrium allocations.
In Figure 2, we illustrate the intuition behind asset testing. If an agent is allowed to consume
freely on the budget line with the slope −(1 + R), he could deviate to a higher indiﬀerence curve
by reasoning identical to the description of Figure 1. Asset testing introduces a non-convexity in
the budget set, and for c1 >c ∗
1 (k>k ∗) shifts the budget line down by the amount Ta − Td.I f
an agent has assets higher than k∗, he receives transfer Ta instead of Td. The budget line is now
represented by a solid line. One can see that an agent chooses to consume (c∗
1,c ∗
d).O u rc h o i c eo f
transfer Ta that a disabled agent receives if he has assets higher than the maximum was motivated
16by convenience, because it means that an agent with high assets will be treated exactly as an able
agent. However, a transfer higher than Ta for those with higher assets can also implement the
optimum, any tax such that the budget line with the slope −(1 + R) is below the tangency to the
indiﬀerence curve and to the left of c∗
1 is also suﬃcient to implement the optimum.
4.3 Implementation: general case
We proceed to formally prove how to construct a tax system that implements the optimal allocation
for a T period case. The tax system we consider is an asset-tested disability insurance system.
All transfers and taxes depend on the number of years spent working before claiming disability.
Transfers also depend on the amount of assets that an agent has. In particular, an agent receives
a disability transfer only if he does not work and his assets are less than some pre-speciﬁed limit.
If his assets are higher than that limit, he has to pay the taxes of an able agent.
Let’s formally deﬁne what comprises an asset-tested disability insurance program.
Deﬁnition 3 An asset-tested disability tax system is a collection of taxes τt(yt,kt) and asset limits
¯ kt where:
• τt(yt,kt)=Td(i) − wyt if yj =0and kj ≤ ¯ kj for some j ≤ t, where i ≤ j is the number
of years before j when y>0.
• τt(yt,kt)=Ta, otherwise.
The agent with assets below the asset limit who chooses not to work in any period j never
returns to work again and gets taxes Td(i) in each period for the rest of his life. We say that such
an agent claims disability in period j. The size of taxes depends on the work history of the agent.
If the agent worked in all years he was productive, his work history is equal to his age.
We will refer to this asset tested system deﬁned above as (Ta,T d(t),¯ kt).
The theorem that follows states the main theoretical result of the paper. We prove that we can
construct an asset-tested disability insurance program such that the optimal allocation is imple-
mented as a competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 1 For any optimal allocation (c∗,y∗) that solves the social planner’s problem, there exists
such an asset-tested disability insurance program (Ta,T d(t),¯ kt) that the optimal allocation is a
solution to the competitive equilibrium problem.
17Proof. See the appendix.
The proof of Theorem 1 includes the same steps as in the example that we discussed earlier.
5 Quantitative Results
The section is organized as follows. We ﬁrst describe a stylized model of the current U.S. social
insurance system that we use to choose the parameters of the model. We proceed to characterize
a solution to the social planner’s problem. We then evaluate the welfare gains of switching to an
optimal social insurance system.
5.1 Parameterization
In this subsection we use a stylized current social security system as a benchmark to choose the
parameters of the model. Since disability insurance is an integral part of the social insurance
system, we model the current social insurance system as a joint disability and retirement system.
We do not make distinction in this model between claiming disability and retirement. If an agent
decides not to work, he receives a social security transfer. An agent can stop working either because
he is truly disabled or because social insurance transfers create a disincentive to work. An agent
can save at a rate R.W h e na na g e n ts t o p sw o r k i n g ,h er eceives a disability transfer Td independent
of the age.
We calibrate the probability of becoming disabled using the data from McNeil (1997), published
by the U.S. Census Bureau. The data report the number of self-reported disabled people by
age groups5. We use the data to calculate a conditional probability of becoming disabled and
extrapolate the data to one-year intervals by ﬁtting an exponential function (see Figure 3).
Table 1 reports shares of disabled people in our model by various age groups. We assume that
4 percent of the population is disabled at age 25, before entering the labor force. We compare
the numbers we calculated to those reported in the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). The SIPP estimates the number of people with
severe disabilities, and the CPS reports the number of people with work disabilities. The CPS does
not have information about work disabilities of people who are over age 65.
5These numbers are self-reported and hence need not reﬂect the true disability of these individuals. However, a
number of papers showed that self-reported health characteristics are a very good approximation of true health. For
one of the recent papers, see Benitez-Silva et al. (2000).
18Table 1
Share of disabled population
Age groups 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74
Model 5.2% 8.33% 13.97% 24.54% 43.19%
CPS (Stoddard et al. (1998)) 5.5% 9.1% 13.2% 23.1% n.a.
SIPP (McNeil (1997)) 8.1% 13.9% 24.2% 30.7%
We choose the parameters of the model such that a solution to the stylized version of the social
insurance system matches selected empirical observations. The utility function is chosen to be
ln(c)+aln(1 − l),w h e r ea is relative disutility of labor. We assume that a period in the economy
is one year and that each agent begins life at age 25 and lives to the age of 75 years6.
We choose the value of disutility of work to be equal to a =1 .5 implying that average working
hours constitute 30 percent of the time endowment. This number is consistent with the micro-
economic evidence that households allocate about one-third of their discretionary time to market
activities (Ghez and Becker 1975). We choose the interest rate in the economy to match an annual
interest rate net of depreciation R to be equal to 4.3 percent. Then we choose the discount factor
β =0 .958 as a solution to
1
β
=1+R. The aggregate production function is a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function with constant returns to scale F(K,Y )=KαY 1−α. In the production
function, we set the capital share equal to α =0 .33.W eu s et h ec a l i b r a t e di n t e r e s tr a t ea n dt h e
capital share to calculate the wage rate w =1 .2243.
We use a lifetime skill proﬁle that we obtained by ﬁtting a quadratic function in the data from
Rios-Rull (1996). Agents achieve the highest skill level at around age 50. At age 50 they are 45
percent more productive then at age 25. After age 50, skills decline and reach the minimum at age
75, with skills being roughly equal to the skill level at age 25 (Figure 4).
5.2 Optimal system
In this subsection we numerically characterize an optimal disability insurance system. A social
planner seeks to provide insurance to disabled agents, while ensuring that able agents work and do
6We also solved a version of the model that does not include the retirement period from age 65 to 75 and obtained
similar results. For more detailed results on computations see the working paper version (Golosov and Tsyvinski
2003).
19not claim disability. The incentive constraint in each period can be written in the following form:
u(ct(A)) − v(yt(A)/θt)+µ(ht+1 = A|ht = A)V a(t +1 )
+µ(ht+1 = t +1 |ht = A)V d(t +1 )=V d(t).
The incentive constraint can be satisﬁed either if the planner gives a relatively higher consump-
tion to the able agent ct(A) then to the disabled ct(t) or by promising a relatively higher value
µ(ht+1 = A|ht = A)V a(t+1)+µ(ht+1 = t+1|ht = A)V d(t+1)to the able agent in future. Similar
to the standard results in the dynamic contracting literature, it is optimal for the planner to use
both of these instruments. Thus the social planner faces two types of trade-oﬀs. The ﬁrst trade-oﬀ
is between intratemporal optimal insurance (making consumption of able and disabled agents con-
stant) and the incentive compatibility constraint (allocating more consumption to able agents to
induce them to work). The second trade-oﬀ is between intertemporal optimal insurance (making
consumption constant across time) and the incentive compatibility constraint (allocating more con-
sumption to able agents who have a longer work history). If disability were perfectly observable,
a planner would be able to achieve both intertemporal and intratemporal smoothing. In that case
consumption of able and disabled agents would be equal and constant over time. However, we will
see that the optimal allocation diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the solution without informational friction.
We start the analysis of the optimal system by calculating a solution to the social planner’s
problem for the parametrized economy described in the previous section.
5.2.1 Consumption proﬁles
We report consumption proﬁles in Figure 5. The solid line represents the consumption of agents
who were able all their lives. This consumption is monotonically increasing with the duration of
agent’s work history. The social planner partially rewards the agent for working in period t by
allocating him a higher value V a(t +1 ) , which leads to higher consumption at future dates. The
consumption of able 65 year olds are about 15% higher than the consumption of able 25 year old
agents.
The dashed line represents consumption that an agent receives if he becomes disabled. After
becoming disabled agent’s consumption remains constant for the rest of his life. Two sample
horizontal lines represent consumption of agents who became disabled at age 40 and age 60. There
is a signiﬁcant fall in consumption after an agent becomes disabled. This drop is necessary to
20ensure that able agents do not deviate and claim disability. Consumption of a 25-year-old agent
falls by about 50 percent from 0.6 to 0.3.
There are two eﬀects that determine consumption of the agent who becomes disabled. First,
eﬃciency requires that more skilled agents work more, and, therefore, the consumption drop should
be larger for such agents to provide incentives. We can see that agents who become disabled at
ages 26 to 40 receive lower consumption then those who became disabled at the age of 25. That is
the period when agent’s productivity raises.
The second eﬀect comes from the intertemporal provision of the incentives. The planner rewards
an agent for working by increasing the value of V d(t). This eﬀect calls for higher consumption for
the agents who become disabled later in life. It dominates the ﬁrst eﬀect around the time when an
agent reaches the age 33. The second eﬀect increases with the work history, so that the consumption
of disabled, the dashed line, raises steeper then the solid line for able agents later in the lifecycle.
In the working paper version of the paper we computed the optimal system for the case when
the skills of the able are the same for all ages. In that case there is only the second eﬀect, and
the consumption of able and disabled monotonically increases with the length of work history since
there is no reason to require middle-aged agents to work more.
5.2.2 Labor
In the calibrated economy it is optimal for all able agents to work. Optimal allocations are inﬂuenced
by two eﬀects in a way similar to the consumption proﬁles. On the one hand, it is optimal to require
more productive agents to work more, and labor supply inherits the hump-shaped form of the skills
proﬁle. Agents who are 45 to 55 year old and have the highest skills spend about 65-70 percent of
their time working. Younger and older people are not as productive and work less.
On the other hand, intertemporal provision of incentive calls for an increase in future V a(t),
which can be partially achieved by reducing amount of labor. For example, 30 and 70 year old
agents have roughly the same skills, however, 30 year old agents work twice as much. In the working
version of the paper we numerically show that when skill proﬁle is constant across time, there is
only this second eﬀect, so that labor supply monotonically decreases with work history.
The provision of intertemporal incentives leads to endogenous retirement. Older agents tend to
work signiﬁcantly less than young agents with similar skills. Agents who are 75 year old and still
productive spend less than 10% of their time working.
215.2.3 Intertemporal distortion
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The intertemporal distortion depends on three factors: probability of becoming disabled, skill
proﬁle, and the length of work history. The probability of becoming disabled increases for older
agents, thus making their future consumption more unpredictable, which increases the distortion.
For higher skilled agents the incentive problems are more severe, and they face a higher intertem-
poral wedge. There two factors explain the steep rise in τ until age 55. The third factor, the length
of work history, decreases the wedge. Agents with longer work history provide less labor and have
smaller variance of consumption. Incentive problems are not as severe for them and they face a
smaller intertemporal distortion.
The interaction of these three eﬀects is shown on Figure 7. The wedge grows from 3 percent at
age 24 to 10.5 percent at age 56, and decreases to 2 percent at age 74. The intertemporal distortion
is quantitatively signiﬁcant, especially given that the probability of becoming disabled is almost an
order of magnitude smaller than the size of the distortion.
5.3 Tax system implementing the optimum
We can use the optimal solution to compute the tax system implementing the optimal allocation.
From the proof of Theorem 1 we know how to construct the asset limits and transfers. We can
calculate and plot asset limits and transfers to disabled in Figures 8 and 9.I nF i g u r e9, a solid line
represents optimal disability transfers that an agent receives for the rest of his life. For example,
an agent who stops working at age 45 will receive approximately 0.35 units of consumption for
the rest of his life. Asset limits are eventually increasing because agents become wealthier as they
accumulate more capital. That is also the reason that disability transfers are decreasing as agents
receive a larger proportion of their income from savings. One interpretation of this system is
that individuals who became disabled early in life receive large transfers, while those who become
disabled later are supposed to supplement their lower disability transfers with savings accumulated
while able.
225.4 Welfare beneﬁts of asset testing
In this subsection we compare the welfare of the best program without asset testing with that of
the optimal insurance system. Theorem 1 and the discussion in Section 4.3 showed that asset-
tested disability transfers allow a government to implement the optimum allocations. In the U.S.,
only a small part of disability insurance system has elements of asset testing. The majority of the
workforce is covered by the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) system in which beneﬁts
are not tied to individual asset holdings.
First, we numerically characterize the optimal disability insurance system without asset testing.
Then we evaluate how much welfare can be increased if the government switches to asset-tested
disability transfers.
We consider a system in which the planner does not have access to asset-tested disability
transfers and cannot impose any intertemporal savings distortion. The optimal disability system
without asset tests is a solution to the social planner’s problem with hidden savings, an example
of which is Diamond and Mirrlees (1995). The model with hidden savings is also similar to that
of Werning (2001), and Abraham and Pavoni (2003). However, the dynamic ﬁrst-order approach
pioneered by Werning and Abraham and Pavoni of imposing the Euler equation on the social
planner’s problem is invalid in our setup7. An agent presented with the solution to such a problem
has a proﬁtable joint deviation of claiming disability and hidden savings. The proof of invalidity of
the ﬁrst-order approach for the model of hidden savings for our setup is similar to the proof that
a linear tax does not implement the optimum described earlier.
Our computational method for the model of hidden savings is similar to that in Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2004). For each lifetime allocation of consumption and labor that a planner oﬀers to
an agent, we compute T optimal joint deviations in which an agent claims disability and chooses
the optimal level of hidden savings, and an additional single deviation in which an agent tells the
truth but chooses a diﬀerent level of savings than that prescribed by the planner. This method is
relatively simple and in our model allows a globally optimal solution to the social planner’s problem
with hidden savings.
In Figure 10, we compare the solution to the problem with asset testing (thick lines) to that
of the problem without asset testing (thin lines). In the latter case, the planner does not have
an ability to distort an intertemporal margin, and, therefore, there is less insurance provided to
7See also Kocherlakota (2004) for a discussion of the ﬁrst order approach.
23an agent. The consumption proﬁles of a young able agent for the case of no asset testing starts
below consumption of an able young for the case of asset testing and increases more rapidly. This
rapid increase is the ﬁrst source of the welfare loss compared to the optimal system as agents prefer
smooth consumption proﬁles. The decline in consumption for agents who are 30-40 years old is
large for the case of no asset testing. This decline is needed to ensure that an agent does not
claim disability before becoming most productive at age 45-50. In the absence of intertemporal
distortion (no asset testing), the planner has to penalize agents who declare disability early by
lower consumption than when asset testing is available, leading to the second source of welfare
losses. Another source of welfare loss in the case of no asset-test is that the consumption proﬁle of
disabled is less smooth than when asset-test is available. In particular, consumption allocations to
those who become disabled rise steeply after age 35.
In Figure 11, we plot labor allocations with and without asset testing (solid and dashed lines,
respectively). The labor proﬁles for both cases are virtually identical until age 40. After age 40,
the absence of asset test implies that it is more diﬃcult to provide incentives to work, and there is
a smaller amount of labor provided. This leads to another source of welfare loss: a lower amount
of labor implies a smaller amount of resources produced in the economy and a smaller amount of
resources available for redistribution to disabled.
In Figure 9, we plotted with a dashed line optimal disability transfers for the model where asset
testing is not allowed. It is evident from this ﬁgure that asset testing allows a signiﬁcant increase
in the level of disability transfers.
We use the following method to measure welfare gains from switching to an optimal system.
We ﬁnd that proportional increase in consumption by 0.65% for each history under the optimal
system without asset testing produces the same lifetime utility as the lifetime utility in an optimal
system with asset testing. This number indicates a signiﬁcant gain to asset testing as the amount
of consumption of disabled (the size of the program) in the model is equal to 4.7 percent of the total
consumption in the optimal solution. The size of the program of 4.7 percent of total consumption
is consistent with the current spending on Social Security and healthcare of elderly and disabled in
the U.S.8
8We have performed extensive robustness checks of the results that are available upon request. Among the
important tests we considered an economy where agents live for 65 years and did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant change in the
results.
246F i n a l R e m a r k s
The paper achieves three goals. First, we provide an implementation of a dynamic optimal social
insurance problem with a simple set of tax instruments in the presence of private savings. Despite
the complexity of such dynamic implementation, we have found a simple and realistic transfer sys-
tem - an asset-tested disability system. Second, the paper provides an incentive theoretic reasoning
for the existence and optimality of asset-tested programs which are prevalent in practice of social
insurance. Our results also extend previous work on means-tested programs to dynamic settings.
Finally, we found that asset testing is quantitatively superior to the programs where asset testing
is not allowed.
The methods developed in this paper may have wider applicability to the design of other social
welfare programs such as unemployment insurance. Another application is design of the retirement
portion of the social security. One view of the Social Security program (Diamond and Mirrlees
1978, 1986 and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1999) is that it provides insurance against the inability
to work in later periods of life. One problem with the current Social Security program is that it
may encourage retirement earlier than socially optimal. Theoretical results on asset testing directly
translate to such a model of social insurance. In the numerical section of the paper, we explored
some implications for welfare of incorporating asset testing.
As the main goal of the paper was to explore a parsimonious dynamic model to highlight the
impact of savings on implementation of the social program, there are several dimensions in which
it can be extended.
It would be interesting to analyze a setup with several levels of unobservable skills, which
will allow more precise choosing of the parameters of the model. We conjecture that general
methodology of implementation derived here can be translated to this setting, with asset test
taking a form of multiple asset tests similar to those used in determination for college ﬁnancial aid.
Another, yet more diﬃcult extension is considering some form of ex-ante heterogeneity such as in
Whinston (1983). This extension would be very challenging as the solutions are very complicated
even in the static setting.
Second, an interesting extension would be to study an economy in which disability is not
permanent. In that case, optimal disability beneﬁts will also have to encourage individuals who
recover from disability to leave disability rolls. This is an interesting extension given current
interest in the proposed policy initiatives such as “Ticket to work” (See SSA 1998). It would
25be also interesting to compare the cost and beneﬁts of the asset testing in a lifecycle model of
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) who found that asset testing is an explanation of low levels
of savings. Our model does not have any other motives for savings than lifecycle and incentive
reasons. Incorporating other motives for savings will allow for a more realistic evaluation of costs
and beneﬁts of asset testing.
We also treated government as the only provider of disability insurance without considering
insurance that is provided by private markets. In our theoretical work (Golosov and Tsyvinski
2004), we provided a model that explored endogenous private markets and the role of government
taxation in such settings.
While the described extensions are interesting, the magnitude of the welfare gains from switching
to the optimal system gives us conﬁdence that the forces we have captured in this paper are
signiﬁcant from both the theoretical and policy-making perspectives.
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297A p p e n d i x
7.1 Characterizing Pareto Optimum
Here we formally prove Propositions 1, 2, 3, and Corollary 2.
Proposition 1:
Part 1
It is straightforward to show that if a feasibility constraint does not hold with equality for some
allocation, it is possible to ﬁnd another feasible and incentive compatible allocation that gives a
higher utility.
Part 2
Suppose an IC does not bind in some period t. Perturb the allocation by decreasing ct(A)
by small ε>0 and increasing ct(t) by εµ(ht = A)/µ(ht = t). The perturbed allocation satisﬁes
feasibility. It is also incentive compatible for ε suﬃciently small. To see this, note that the IC in
period t is relaxed. >From concavity, V a(t−1) increases while the value of V d(t−1) is unchanged.
By backward induction we can show that all the incentive constraints in period 1,...,tdo not bind.
Part 3
Consider the FOCs for ct(A) and ct(t) where λ and ηt are Lagrangian multipliers on the feasi-
bility and time t period incentive constraints:































30The right hand side of this equation is positive as well as the expression in the square brackets.
Therefore u0(ct(t)) − u0(ct(A)) > 0 which implies that ct(A) >c t(t).
Propositions 2, 3, and Corollary 2:
Simplify incentive compatibility constraints. There are only T incentive constraints. We rewrite











for all θt > 0.T a k i n g t h e ﬁrst order conditions and simplifying yields Propositions 2 and 3.




7.2 Proof of Theorem 1.
We construct an asset-tested disability system (Ta,T d(t),¯ kt) that implements (c∗,y∗) as a compet-



































Finally, the asset limits ¯ k are deﬁned recursively
c∗
t(A)+¯ kt+1 = wy∗
t(A)+( 1+R)¯ kt + Ta
with ¯ k1 =0 .














Now we show that this asset tested system implements (c∗,y∗) as a competitive equilibrium.
First, we prove that the expected present value of transfers for the able agent is lower than the
present value of disability transfers.




















(1 + R)i. (21)

















(1 + R)i. (22)
Suppose equation (22) does not hold for some t. Then the social planner could give the allocation
of the disabled ({c∗
t+i(t)}i=T−t
i=0 ,0) to the agents who are still able in period t. Since the period t
incentive constrain holds with equality from Proposition 1, the utility of the agent does not change.
The new allocation is still incentive compatible, but the feasibility constraint is relaxed. The social
planner can further improve upon such an allocation, therefore, (c∗,y∗) cannot be an optimum.
Let’s derive a useful corollary to Lemma 1.
Corollary 3 Ta ≤ Td(t) for any t.




(µ(hT = A|hT−1 = A)Ta + µ(hT = T|hT−1 = A)Td(T))







Since Ta ≤ Td(T) the above equation implies
Ta ≤ Td(T − 1).
By backward induction can show that for all t
Ta ≤ Td(t).
32Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. Consider the asset tested system constructed as described above. Since the agent maximizes
continuous utility function over a compact budget set9, there exists a maximum. Pick any allocation
(˜ c, ˜ y) together with his saving decisions (˜ k) that maximizes agent’s utility. We will show that the
utility from such allocations cannot be higher then the utility from (c∗,y∗).
Step 1: There exists a utility maximizing allocation (˜ c, ˜ y,˜ k) such that an agent never claims
disability if he is able.
Suppose that an agent is strictly better oﬀ by claiming disability if he is able in some period
j. The agent can claim disability in period j o n l yi fh i sa s s e t si nt h a tp e r i o da r e˜ kj ≤ ¯ kj. Suppose
˜ kj = ¯ kj. By construction the maximum utility the agent can obtain if his assets are ¯ kj and his
taxes are Td(j) − wyt for all the subsequent periods is u(c∗
j(j)) + ... + βT−ju(c∗
T(j)), which is the
utility that the Social Planner allocates to the agent who becomes disabled in period j. But the
agent with assets ¯ kj in period j can choose the future path ({c∗}T
t=j,{y∗}T
t=j) as it is in his budget
constraint. By the incentive compatibility of the optimal allocations, this future path gives weakly
higher utility than claiming disability in period j.
Alternatively, suppose ˜ kj < ¯ kj. Agent’s utility maximization implies that ˜ cj(j) <c ∗
j(j). The
allocation is utility maximizing in this case if
u0(˜ cj−1(A)) = β(1 + R)u0(˜ cj(j)).
If this Euler equation did not hold, an agent could transfer a small amount of resources ε intertem-
porally. Such a transfer still allows him to claim disability in period j, and gives strictly higher
utility. Since ˜ cj(j) <c ∗
j(j) this implies together with Corollary 1 that u0(˜ cj−1(A)) >u 0(c∗
j−1(A)).









= u0 (˜ cj−1(A))w,
imply that ˜ kj−1 < ¯ kj−1. We can continue backward to show that ˜ kt < ¯ kt for all t<j .However, this
implies that ˜ k1 < ¯ k1 =0which is impossible. We showed that there exists a utility maximizing
allocation in which an agent never claims disability when he is able.
9The budget set is closed since Ta ≤ Td(t) for all t.
33Step 2: The constructed asset tested system implements the optimum.
We show that if the conditions of Step 1 are satisﬁed, the utility maximizing allocation must
be feasible and incentive compatible. Therefore, it cannot give a higher utility than (c∗,y∗).
The allocation is incentive compatible since it comes from the agent’s maximization problem.
From Step 1, the able agent always receives a transfer Ta. Corollary 3 shows that Ta ≤ Td(t) for
all t, so that this is the lowest possible transfer (the highest tax since Ta ≤ 0) the agent can receive.
Note that if an agent saves more than ¯ ki in some period i−1 and becomes disabled in period i,h e
receives transfer Ta until his savings fall below the asset limit, after which he is entitled to Td(i).
The present value of such transfers is lower than the present value of the transfers to the agent who
could claim disability in period i, which is equal to Td(i)
¡
1+... +1 /(1 + R)T−i¢
.








































Figure 2: Asset-testing implements the optimum









Figure 3: Conditional probability of becoming disabled









Figure 4: Skill proﬁle


























Consumption is constant after becoming disabled 
Figure 5: Optimal consumption proﬁles of agents over lifetime
















Figure 6: Optimal labor proﬁle































Figure 7: Intertemporal wedge in the optimal system






























Figure 8: Asset limits implementing optimal system





























Transfers without Asset Testing
Figure 9: Transfers























Figure 10: Consumption with asset-test (thick lines) and without asset-test (thin lines).
















Figure 11: L a b o rw i t ha s s e t - t e s t( s o l i d )a n dw i t h o u ta s s e t - t e s t( d a s h e d ) .
45